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Abstract
In this paper we show that response facilitation in choice reaction tasks achieved by priming the (previously perceived)
effect is based on stimulus-response associations rather than on response-effect associations. The reduced key-press
response time is not accounted for by earlier established couplings between the key-press movement and its subsequent
effect, but instead results from couplings between this effect and the contingent key-release movement. This key-release
movement is an intrinsic part of the entire performed response action in each trial of a reaction-time task, and always
spontaneously follows the key-press movement. Eliminating the key-release movement from the task leads to the
disappearance of the response facilitation, which raises the question whether response-effect associations actually play a
role in studies that use the effect-priming paradigm. Together the three experiments presented in the paper cast serious
doubts on the claim that action-effect couplings are acquired and utilized by the cognitive system in the service of action
selection, and that the priming paradigm by itself can provide convincing evidence for this claim. As a corollary, we question
whether the related two-step model for the ideomotor principle holds a satisfying explanation for how anticipation of
future states guides action planning. The results presented here may have profound implications for priming studies in
other disciplines of psychology as well.
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Introduction
William James’ ideomotor principle suggests that anticipation of
the consequences of movements is an important, if not essential,
feature of action control [1]. In the past few decades a strong case
has been built in support of the ideomotor principle and its role in
voluntary goal-directed action (e.g. [2–4]; for an overview see [5]).
By now ideomotor thinking has been widely adopted across
various fields of psychology and it is generally believed to be one of
the fundamental mechanisms underlying human behavior. Appli-
cations can be found in research on social cognition [6–9],
imitation [10–12], as well as in several neuroscience studies [13–
16]. In addition, several studies on the development of means-end
behavior and memory and retention, such as for instance the
famous ‘mobile’ conditioning paradigm by Rovee-Collier and
coworkers [17,18] have been reinterpreted to fit the framework of
ideomotor theory (see e.g. [19]).
In contemporary theoretical accounts of the ideomotor principle
it is argued that the intention of bringing about an external sensory
effect (e.g., the sound of a ringing doorbell) triggers the appropriate
motor codes that led to the production of the effect at previous
occasions (i.e., pushing the button). Moreover, it is claimed that
actions are actually arranged this way within the cognitive system,
that is, in a common-coding framework [4]. To be more specific,
motor codes are represented according to the codes of their
associated sensory events. In the present study however, we report
evidence suggesting that such simple one-to-one and bidirectional
associations between effect representations and action representa-
tions insufficiently capture the mechanisms underlying the
ideomotor principle.
Models of the mechanisms of ideomotor action control
generally consist of two distinct stages (see e.g. [20]). The first
stage concerns the formation of couplings between performed
movements and their associated consequences (effects) in the
environment. In the second stage, voluntary goal-directed action is
initiated by anticipating on the effect and using the previously
formed association for the recruitment of appropriate (effect-
related) motor codes. This two-step model affords a straightfor-
ward empirical design for testing its viability [2]: Arbitrary
associations between movements (e.g. in response to irrelevant
stimuli) and effects should be learnable in a task by repeatedly
pairing them in an acquisition phase, such that the former appears
to specifically produce the latter. Afterwards, in a separate
utilization phase, the mere occurrence of one of the effects (i.e.,
priming) should trigger the associated action, or at least speed up
its selection.
In an influential series of studies, Hommel and coworkers ([20–
22]; see also [23,24]) use this design in the context of a choice
reaction task. The general experimental procedure is as follows
(see Figure 1A): In the acquisition phase, participants have to press
one key after seeing a certain stimulus and another key after seeing
a different stimulus (e.g., ‘Right key’ following ‘X’ and ‘Left key’
following ‘O’). Immediately after each key press a specific tone is
sounded, with a different pitch for each key (e.g., ‘High pitch’
following ‘Right key’ and ‘Low pitch’ following ‘Left key’). In the
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subsequent test phase, the tone is sounded already at stimulus
presentation. Of the four possible stimulus+tone combinations,
two are compatible in the sense that both should trigger the same
response (i.e., a specific key press), and two are incompatible
because of their conflicting response associations. The results seem
to be in accordance with the two-step model described above:
Response times in compatible trials are lower than those in
incompatible trials (for an example of the results of such an
experiment, see the solid [RT] line in Figure 2). That is, response
selection in the test phase appears to be prompted by the response-
effect associations that are formed in the acquisition phase
between each specific key press (i.e., ‘Right key’ and ‘Left key’)
and a specific tone (i.e., ‘High pitch’ and ‘Low pitch’, respectively).
In the present study we started from the same basic design.
However, as revealed by a careful examination of the event
sequence within each trial of the task, each response action in a
simple or choice reaction task consists of two subsequent but
connected movement parts: After having pressed the key,
participants always spontaneously release the key again before
the start of the next trial, without being explicitly instructed to do
so. Importantly, the key-press movement and key-release move-
ment are an integrate part of the same ongoing action, although
they take place at subsequent instances in time and (partly) involve
the recruitment of different motor subsystems. Previous studies
have neglected the latter part of the action in reaction-time tasks,
and, consequently, not much is known about the role of the key-
release movement in this context. One exception is a recent study
demonstrating that key-press and key-release response latencies
are uncorrelated and that both movement parts can be
manipulated independently of each other [25]. This suggests that,
although both movements are clearly part of the same response
action, separate control mechanisms might be at work.
Following on this ‘two-component’ response notion, in Exper-
iment 1 we measured key contact duration in addition to response
time in a replication of Hommel’s study [22] (Experiment 3
therein). Starting immediately after the key has been pressed, key
contact duration measures how long it takes until the participant
releases the key again. This provides an indication of how long it
takes to select the appropriate second movement-part of the
response action. Although we expect to find similar results as
discussed above for the response times, no specific hypotheses can
be derived from the two-step model with respect to the key-release
times. However, if key release is merely a reflexive and arid
retraction movement following key press, unrelated to the other
aspects of the task (as might be taken from the absence of key
release in the two-step model), there is no reason to expect any
difference in key contact duration between the compatible trials
and the incompatible trials. In that case, motor codes for the key-
release movement would be available equally fast after the key is
pressed. However, if we find a difference in key contact duration
between these trial types, we must consider an alternative
explanation. This explanation should incorporate the key-release
movement as an integral and relevant component of the complete
response action, and of the entire task, as suggested in this paper.
Experiment 1
Method
Ethics statement. Participation in this study was voluntary
and with written informed consent. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee of the Behavioural Science Institute of
the Radboud University Nijmegen.
Participants. Twenty-five undergraduate students with a
mean age of 19.8 years (SD= 2.1 years; range= 17–27 years)
participated in the experiment, for which they were rewarded 5
euros or course credits. All participants were naı¨ve to the purpose
of the experiment, were right-handed and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
Experimental design, materials, and procedure. In
Experiment 1 we used the same set up as was used in Experiment
3 of Hommel’ study [22]. Participants were seated at a table in
front of a 15-inch monitor, with their hands on a buttonbox. First,
participants performed 200 acquisition trials, each consisting of the
following sequence of events: At the start a fixation asterisk (*) was
shown for 500 ms, which was followed by the stimulus presenta-
tion after 150 ms. The stimulus was either the letter ‘X’ or the
letter ‘O’, appearing for 150 ms, at random, 100 of each in total.
Participants had to respond to this stimulus as quickly as possible
by pressing the corresponding right or left key. As an effect
following this key press, a specific tone was sounded for 100 ms,
with a pitch of either 300 Hz or 600 Hz. Participants were told to
ignore the tones.
In the subsequent test phase, another 80 trials were performed.
These trials were identical to the trials in the acquisition phase,
except that now one of the tones was sounded simultaneous with
presentation of the letter. In half of the trials, letter and tone
matched with respect to the response that was required or that
seemed to have caused it in the acquisition phase, respectively.
These were the compatible trials (C trials). In the incompatible
trials (IC trials), stimulus and tone corresponded to different
responses in this respect. In the test phase, the tone was still
sounded after the key press, to maintain the coupling between
action and effect. All possible stimulus (letter; X/O) – response
(key; right/left) – effect (tone; high/low) combinations were
counterbalanced across participants.
Two types of response latency were measured: Response time
(RT) was defined as the time interval between stimulus presen-
tation and pressing of the response key. Key contact duration
(KCD) was defined as the time interval between pressing the
response key and releasing that key again.
Data analysis: General strategy. We followed a response
latency analysis strategy that involved fitting linear mixed effect
models to transformed latency data with moderate a-priori
trimming (see [26] and [27]). The procedure was the same for
all experiments reported in this paper: 1. Find a proper scale for
the data (log transform); 2. Remove data points that are physically,
or by design impossible (responses faster than 50 ms and slower
than 1000 ms were removed); 3. Check the distribution for each
participant with a Shapiro-Wilk test [27]. The proportion
participants whose latency distribution needed outlier removal in
each experiment did not exceed 15% of each sample. The outliers
were detected based on a distribution fit of the data (e.g. [28]). Up
to a maximum of 5 data points marked as outliers on the left side
of the distribution and 5 on the right side were removed; 4.
Analyze and exclude erroneous responses. Note that Hommel and
coworkers [20–22] do not exclude error responses before analysis,
whereas others [23,24] do exclude errors; 5. The modeling
strategy was the same for all experiments: A linear mixed effect
model was fitted by maximum likelihood with Latency as the
dependent variable. The fixed effects in the model were: S-R
Compatibility with the levels Compatible (C) and Incompatible
(IC) indicating the trial type; Latency Type with the levels
Reaction Time (RT) and Key Contact Duration (KCD) indicating
the response type under analysis; the interaction between S-R
Compatibility and Latency Type. The factors were defined such
that the fixed Intercept coincided with Reaction Time of the
Compatible kind. The random effects in the model were trials
nested within participants; random intercepts and slopes were
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Figure 1. Outline of the twomodels. (A) Outline of the two-step model for the ideomotor principle (see e.g. [21]). Response-effect (R-E) couplings
are established between key press and tone in the acquisition phase. This results in response facilitation in the test phase when at stimulus
presentation the matching tone (with respect to this stimulus) is sounded, but not when the other tone is sounded. (B) Outline of the alternative
model based on stimulus-response (S-R) couplings established between Stimulus and Response component 1 and between Effect and Response
component 2. The difference in response latencies between compatible and incompatible trials for both movements is accounted for by cooperation
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estimated for each participant. The predictions deduced from our
hypotheses in all three experiments were about the presence or
absence of a Compatibility Effect (CE) associated with a response
type (key-press or key-release). For each set of experiments we
conducted a model based planned comparison (i.e. simultaneous
tests for general linear hypotheses [29]) of the CE (Latency of IC
trials.Latency of C trials) for the two types of measured response
latency.
The data were analyzed in R [30] using the extremevalues package
[31] for outlier detection, the nlme package [32] for fitting the
linear mixed effects model and the multcomp package [33] to
conduct the multiple comparisons after lme modeling. Appendix S1
is a.zip archive that contains the raw data and annotated R scripts
that were used to obtain all the results reported in this paper.
Results
The Percentage Error (PE) was 2.0% of valid trials in
Experiment 1 and was analyzed as a function of S-R Compatibility
of the trials (e.g. [22,23]). There was no significant difference in the
errors made on valid compatible and incompatible trials (1.9% vs.
2.1%; t(24) =20.20, p = 0.846 ). The error trials were discarded
and further analyses were conducted on 97.0% of the raw data (see
table S1 for a breakdown of PE and valid cases into trial type).
Figure 2 displays the observed means (with 95% CI) for the two
types of response latency measured in the experiment as a function
of S-R Compatibility. The values of the means and confidence
intervals are reported in Table S1. The results of the linear mixed
model fit (for details see Table S2) reveal there is a significant main
effect of S-R Compatibility (Estimate = 0.03, SE = .01,
t(3826) = 2.82, Pr(.|t|) = 0.005) indicating IC trials elicit slower
responses than C trials. There was also a significant main effect of
response type (Estimate =20.10, SE= 0.01, t(3826) =28.88,
Pr(.|t|) = 0.001) points to faster responses associated with key-
releases (KCD latencies,RT latencies). The interaction between
S-R Compatibility and response type was not significant (see Table
S2 for details). A comparison of the CE for each response type
separately was made using a simultaneous test for general linear
hypotheses. This revealed a significant effect for both RT (RTIC-
C = 0.032, SE = 0.011, z= 2.82, Pr(.z) = 0.005) and KCD
(KCDIC-C = 0.036, SE = 0.011, z= 3.15, Pr(.z) = 0.002; Note that
we round to three digits when reporting the small difference score
estimates due to the log scale.). The reported p-values were
adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method.
Summarizing, these results appear to indicate the effect of trial
compatibility occurs for the key-release movement as well as for
the key-press movement. In fact, the CE based on the predicted
latencies is 14–15 ms for both response types (Table S1).
Discussion
Why does this effect occur for the key release in the test phase?
Since there was no external sensory effect following key release in
the acquisition phase, no response-effect (R-E) coupling could have
been formed with this movement. This means that the difference
in key contact duration between the compatible and incompatible
trials of the test phase cannot be explained within the two-step
model for the ideomotor principle.
However, notice the temporal contiguity between the sounding
tone and the key-release movement in each trial of the task. It is
because of these repeated co-occurrences that stimulus-response
(S-R) couplings were established between them. To be more
precise, each of the two release movements, that is, release of the
right key or of the left key, was specifically coupled to one of the
two tones, that is, either to the high pitch tone or to the low pitch
tone. Building on this observation, we propose a more parsimo-
nious model with S-R couplings rather than R-E couplings, to
account the results of the effect-priming studies (see Figure 1B). As
will be demonstrated below, this model can explain the
compatibility effects for both action components.
In order to explain the compatibility effect in effect-priming
studies in terms of S-R couplings we depart from the same source
upon which the two-step model and the common-coding
framework are built; William James’ description of the ideomotor
principle: ‘‘every representation of a movement awakens in some
degree the actual movement which is the object; and awakens it in
a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an
antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind’’
[1]. Incompatible trials are such cases in which the actual
movement is not activated ‘‘in a maximum degree’’ due to
simultaneous presentation of stimuli that are coupled to antago-
nistic (aspects of) movements. Compatible trials are cases in which
it is assumed that ‘‘every representation of a movement awakens in
some degree the actual movement’’, refers to some additive or
cooperative effect in movement activation by different stimuli that
are coupled to an aspect the actual movements share.
We make the assumption that conflicting cues about the
laterality of a movement to be executed by an index finger give rise
to a higher degree of antagonism or competition than conflicting
cues about the vertical direction (i.e. press or release) of a
movement when laterality cues are not in conflict, comparable to
the Simon effect. For incompatible trials the stimulus-tone
presentation will result in increased response latency for the key-
press and key-release movements because the tone will activate a
movement that differs in laterality from the movement the
stimulus activates. As the key is pressed and the effect-tone is
sounded, both events activate the key-release action for the finger
that performed the key-press action. This will compete with the
movement activation elicited by the tone presented at the
beginning of the trial that activated the key-release action of
opposite laterality (see Figure 1B). In compatible trials the
stimulus-tone combination is always in accordance with the
laterality of the movements that are activated and after the key-
press action is performed, the effect tone, the key-press movement
and the tone presented at the beginning of the trial are not in
conflict to activate the key-release action.
Note that this mechanism is essentially the same as the one
proposed by the two-step model. Both models accommodate for
the formation of contiguity associations between various percep-
tion and action components in the task. They differ only in the
theoretical units used to explain the compatibility effect: S-R
couplings between observables that can be precisely defined in the
physical environment of the brain versus R-E couplings between
abstract representations of sensorimotor codes stored in the brain.
To elaborate, these associations, which do the explanatory work in
the models and account for the empirical findings, have a
fundamentally different ontological status. In the S-R model, one-
way couplings are formed between stimuli and subsequent responses
as simple conditioned associations of the stimulus and response
context, whereas in the two-step model bi-directional couplings are
and competition mechanisms between the two response-selection processes (triggered by the S-R couplings). Importantly, the two response
components are to be understood as an integrate part of the same ongoing response action. This schematic merely temporally separates them along
the time line of the task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054094.g001
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created between encoded representations of aspects of responses and
subsequent effects. It isourclaimthat thecompatibility effect found in
effect priming studies does not necessarily imply such R-E couplings
exist, nor that James’ ideomotor principle is actually at work in these
studies. The compatibility effect can completely and elegantly be
understood within a framework of S-R couplings as suggested by
Watson’s [34] or perhaps even by means of Pavlov’s classical
conditioning [35].
Thesubsequentexperimentsexplicitly tested thealternativemodel
for the ‘priming’ effect introduced above. In Experiment 2A and 2B
the two movement-components of the response action were isolated
(key-press only in Experiment 2A and key-release only in Experiment
2B). According to the two-step model this decomposition should have
no influence on the effect. Consequently, a null-result in these
experiments would falsify the two-step model in favor of the
alternative model. In Experiment 3A and 3B the acquisition phase
consisted of two response-components again, but now no imperative
exogenous stimulus was presented in the task. This part replicated
ElsnerandHommel’s study[21] (Experiment1 therein; seealso [23]),
which is an improved version of the earlier procedure used in
Experiment 1 (see [22]). In the test phase however, participants again
only performed one response-component (key-press only in Exper-
iment 3A and key-release only in Experiment 3B), where the earlier
effect now served as stimulus. Differences in the pattern of response
latenciesbetweenthe twoversionsof theexperimentwilldemonstrate
whether the effect in the acquisition phase is either coupled to the first
(key-press)movement,asaccountedforandexplainedbythetwo-step
model, or the second (key-release) movement, as accounted for and
explained by the alternative model.
Experiment 2A and 2B
To verify whether the S-R model proposed above indeed
accurately and completely captures the mechanisms that lead to
the results found in effect-priming choice reaction tasks, we
performed a second set of experiments. These were designed to
specifically test the actual formation of R-E couplings in the
acquisition phase. Experiment 2A and 2B again followed the
general procedure described earlier, but ruled out the possibility of
forming a second S-R coupling in the task by explicitly eliminating
the second movement. This was done in two different ways: Either
by asking participants to keep the key pressed after responding to
the stimulus (i.e. not releasing again; Experiment 2A) or by asking
them to perform a key-release action as the single-component
response (Experiment 2B).
Method
Ethics statement. Participation in this study was voluntary
and with written informed consent. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee of the Behavioural Science Institute of
the Radboud University Nijmegen.
Participants. A total of 52 undergraduate students with a
mean age of 20.5 years (SD= 2.3 years; range = 18–28 years)
participated in the experiment, for which they were rewarded 5
euros or course credits. All participants were naı¨ve to the purpose
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. The observed means (with 95% CI) for the two types of response latency measured in Experiment 1 as a
function of S-R Compatibility of the trials. The values of the means, confidence intervals and size of the Compatibility Effect (CE) are reported in Table
S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054094.g002
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of the experiment, were right-handed and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
Experimental design, materials, and procedure. The
main design (i.e., letter stimuli, effect tones, timing and duration of
events, and number of trials in both phases of the task) was
identical to Experiment 1, except for the required response. Half
of the participants (N= 26) were assigned to the key-press only
variation (Experiment 2A), where at the start of each trial in the
acquisition phase they were instructed by a message on the screen,
to keep their index fingers over the keys. After the fixation asterisk,
upon stimulus presentation, they had to press the appropriate key
and keep it pressed. This key press triggered the sounding of the
corresponding tone. Thousand milliseconds after this, a message
appeared on the screen instructing participants to release the key
and prepare for the next trial by holding both fingers over the keys
again. The other half of the participants (N = 26) performed the
key-release only variation of the (Experiment 2B), in which they
were instructed by a message on the screen to press down both
keys with their index fingers before the start of the trial. Now,
upon stimulus presentation, they had to release (only) the
appropriate key without pressing it again. In this variation, key
release triggered the tone. Before the start of each new trial they
were asked to prepare for the next stimulus and press both keys
again.
Response time and key contact duration were defined as the
time interval between stimulus presentation (response cue) and key
press or key release, respectively. Note that key contact duration
plays a different role in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1.
Similar to Experiment 1, in the test phase of both variations,
letter and tone were presented together at the beginning of each
trial again. The rest of the procedure was the same as in the
acquisition phase.
Results and Discussion
The PE was 4.1% of valid trials in Experiment 2A (RT) and
5.8% in Experiment 2B (KCD). There were no significant
differences in the errors made on valid C and IC trials (RT:
3.1% vs. 5.2%, t(25) =22.04, p = 0.052; KCD: 4.9% vs. 6.6%,
t(25) =21.44, p = 0.162). The error trials were discarded and
further analyses were conducted on 95.8% of the measured RT
trials and 93.8% of the KCD trials (see Table S1 for a breakdown
of PE and valid cases into Latency Type and S-R Compatibility of
trials).
Figure 3 displays the observed means (with 95% CI) for the two
types of response latency measured in the experiment as a function
of S-R Compatibility. The values of the means and confidence
intervals are reported in Table S1. The result of the linear mixed
model fit show there are no significant main or interaction effects
in the model (see Table S2 for details). The predicted difference
between IC and C trials does appear to be in the direction of a CE:
CERT = 5 ms, CEKCD = 6 ms. Our prediction for this experiment
was the absence of a CE, but we can of course only show it is
statistically unlikely there is a compatibility effect. A testable
hypothesis that could add some more credibility to our prediction
would be that CE for each response type in Experiment 2 should
Figure 3. Results of the test phase of the two single-movement response variations of Experiment 2. The observed means (with 95% CI)
for the two types of response latency measured in Experiments 2A and 2B as a function of S-R Compatibility of the trials. The values of the means,
confidence intervals and size of the Compatibility Effect (CE) are reported in Table S1. In Experiment 2A participants had to press and hold down the
correct key upon stimulus presentation, in Experiment 2B participants had to release the correct key upon stimulus presentation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054094.g003
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at least be significantly smaller than the CE observed in
Experiment 1 (H1: CEEXP2, CEEXP1). The estimated CEs
obtained from the previously reported simultaneous test of trial
compatibility in the linear effects model fitted to the data of
Experiment 1 were used as critical values to the CEs predicted by
the model fitted to the data of experiment 2. Results show the
compatibility effects for RT and KCD were significantly smaller in
Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1 (RTIC-C_EXP1 = 0.032,
RTIC-C_EXP2 = 0.013, SE = 0.009, z=22.14, Pr(.z) = 0.03);
KCD IC-C_EXP1 = 0.036, KCDIC-C_EXP2 = 0.018, SE = 0.009,
z=22.03, Pr(.z) = 0.04. The reported p-values were adjusted
for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method). The
estimated upper bound of the family-wise 95% CI for the
difference between IC and C trials was 0.031 and 0.035 for RT
and KCD respectively.
Results of both experiments are clear: There was no longer any
evidence of facilitation in action selection caused by effect priming.
More specifically, the difference between the compatible and
incompatible response latencies in the test phase was negligible in
both experiments.
Any null-result, even when predicted, has obvious interpretation
difficulties. To provide additional evidence that it is unlikely that
the priming effect was present we compared the size of the
compatibility effects found in Experiment 1 with those found in
Experiments 2A and 2B. The compatibility effect for each
response type in Experiment 2 was smaller than the CE found
in Experiment 1. The cross-experiment comparison, in addition to
the non-significant estimated effect sizes in the linear mixed model
make it highly unlikely that there was a priming effect present in
Experiment 2A and 2B.
Experiment 3A and 3B
The results of Experiment 2A and 2B might be explained
alternatively by referring to the difference that exists between the
sensorimotor (stimulus-based) mode and the ideomotor (intention-
based) mode of ideomotor learning. The distinction between these
two modes was recently made by Herwig, Prinz, and Waszak
([23]; see also [24]). Their study demonstrated that participants
only form action-effect associations when they are working in the
intention-based action mode. That is, whenever the action to be
performed is selected endogenously rather than exogenously.
Within that framework the lack of forming R-E couplings in both
Experiment 2A and 2B would be attributed to the fact that the
acquisition phase of both versions was performed in the
sensorimotor mode rather than the ideomotor mode.
Another possible shortcoming of the design of the previous
experiments is that strictly speaking no direct predictions with
respect to possible differences in response-effect associations
between one-movement and two-movement actions can be
derived from the two-step model. The model simply does not
incorporate an analysis of different movement components in its
description of the underlying mechanisms. However, it does not
specifically proscribe this distinction either. So, on the one hand,
there is nothing in the two-step model that would exclude the one-
movement actions from the domain of ideomotor learning. But, on
the other hand, it might still be opposed that a deconstruction of
the action, and the resulting separation of the movement
components, as was done in Experiment 2A and 2B, affects the
mechanism of ideomotor learning to the extent that it impedes
with the formation of R-E couplings. Although such a disruption
cannot be explained within the two-step model as yet, it
nevertheless may weaken our conclusions based on the one-
movement acquisition phase.
These concerns give rise to the following two alterations in the
design of the previous experiments (see Figure 4): First, in the
following set of experiments no imperative exogenous stimulus was
presented in the acquisition phase, in order to assure that this
phase was performed in the ideomotor mode [23]. In the test
phase, the effect served as the stimulus in a forced-choice reaction
task. Second, the acquisition phase contained a two-component
response. That is, participants could release the key at will after
pressing it, without being explicitly instructed about this second
movement. Contrary, in the test phase, a one-movement response
was required from the participants. The acquisition phase of the
following set of experiments was similar to that of Experiment 1 in
Elsner and Hommel’s study [21], whereas the test phase only
differed with respect to the number of response components.
Together these alterations also make sure that the latest version of
the response-effect paradigm was used in this critical last
experiment.
This design not only addressed the two critical notes discussed
above, it also resulted in a clear distinction between the two-step
model and the stimulus-response model introduced here: The two-
step model predicts R-E couplings that link the first response-
component (key press) to the subsequent effect (tone), whereas the
S-R model predicts S-R couplings between the effect (tone) and
the subsequent second response-component (key release). These
predictions translate into sharply distinct patterns of response
latencies in the one-movement test phase: The difference between
the acquisition-compatible and acquisition-incompatible condition
is either present in the key-press only version (Experiment 3A; as
predicted by the two-step model) or in the key-release only version
(Experiment 3B; as predicted by the S-R model). The mechanisms
according to the S-R model are visualized in Figure 4.
Method
Ethics statement. Participation in this study was voluntary
and with written informed consent. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee of the Behavioural Science Institute of
the Radboud University Nijmegen.
Participants. In these experiments a total of 120 undergrad-
uate students participated. The mean age of this group was 21.1
years (SD = 2.5 years; range = 18–31 years). Participants were naı¨ve
to the purpose of the experiment, were right-handed and had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received 5 euros or
course credits for their participation.
Experimental Design, Materials, and Procedure
Acquisition phase. In the 200 trials of the acquisition phase,
participants pressed one of the keys at will, as quickly as they
could, following a non-specific trigger. No imperative exogenous
stimulus was presented, making this a free-choice reaction task
instead of a forced-choice reaction task like Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2. Participants were instructed to randomly select
which key to press, but to keep the total number of left and right
key presses about equal. After 100 trials subjects were informed
how many times they had pressed the left key and the right key.
No instructions were given with respect to key release. Pressing a
key triggered one of two different tones (300 Hz or 600 Hz) to be
sounded for 100 ms, where each tone specifically followed either a
right-key press or a left-key press. Response (Key) –effect (tone)
combinations were counterbalanced across participants.
Test phase. In the test phase, only a single-movement
response was required. As in Experiment 2, there were two
variations (see Figure 4): Experiment 3A was the key-press only
variation and Experiment 3B was the key-release only variation.
At the start of this phase, participants were instructed to perform a
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Figure 4. Setup of Experiment 3A and Experiment 3B in terms of the S-R model. The acquisition phase of both versions of the experiment
was identical, consisting of two response components and without an imperative stimulus, such that they were performed in the ideomotor mode
(for more details see text). (A) In the test phase of the key-press only version (Experiment 3A), response selection is not facilitated by the S-R coupling
between Effect (tone) and Response component 2 (key release). (B) In the test phase of the key-release only version (Experiment 3B), this S-R coupling
does influence response selection, leading to differences in response latencies between the compatible and incompatible conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054094.g004
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stimulus-response experiment, in which the two effect tones were
used as target stimulus, specifically coupled to a key press
(Experiment 3A) or a key release (Experiment 3B). They had to
respond to the stimulus (either ‘high’ or ‘low’ pitch tone) as quickly
as possible, with either the left key or the right key. In of both
experiments there were two compatible conditions: One subgroup
performed an acquisition-compatible stimulus-response combina-
tion. These participants had to respond to the stimulus (i.e. effect
tone) by pressing or releasing the key that was always paired with
this effect tone in the acquisition phase. The other subgroup
performed an acquisition-incompatible stimulus-response combi-
nation. These participants had to respond to the stimulus (i.e.
effect tone) by pressing or releasing the opposite key, with respect
to the link in the acquisition phase. The specific stimulus (tone) –
response (key) combination was instructed before the start of the
test phase. Participants were assigned randomly to the conditions
and variations of the experiment, such that each of the four
combinations included 30 participants. The test phase consisted of
100 trials.
Response time and key contact duration were defined similar to
Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
During the acquisition phase of the key-press only experiment
(3A), participants pressed the right key 50.3% of the time and the
left key 49.6% of the time and 0.1% were missed or invalid trials.
For the key-release only experiment (3B) the key release
percentages were 49.5% for the left key, 50.2% for the right key
and 0.3% were missed or invalid trials.
The PE was 2.8% of valid trials in the test phase of Experiment
3A (RT) and 6.4% in Experiment 3B (KCD). As was the case in
Experiment 2, the key-release only experiments elicited more
erroneous responses than the key-press only experiments did.
However, a two sample t-test with Welch adjustment of the
degrees of freedom was conducted for each latency type showed
no significant differences in the errors made on valid C and IC
trials (RT: 3.0% vs. 2.7%, t(56.0) = 0.54, Pr(.|t|) = 0.588; KCD:
6.3% vs. 6.5%, t(57.7) =20.06, Pr(.|t|) = 0.954). The error trials
were discarded and further analyses were conducted on 97.0% of
the measured RT trials and 93.1% of the KCD trials (see table S1
for a breakdown of PE and valid cases into Latency Type and S-R
Compatibility of trials).
Figure 5 displays the observed means (with 95% CI) for the two
types of response latency measured in the experiment as a function
of S-R Compatibility. The values of the means and confidence
intervals are reported in Table S1. The result of the linear mixed
model fit in Table S2 shows that there are no significant main
effects, but the interaction effect is significant (Estimate = 0.137,
SE = 0.063, t(116) = 2.16, Pr(.|t|) = 0.033). A simultaneous test
for general linear hypotheses showed the compatibility effect was
only significant for KCD (RTC-IC =20.044, SE= 0.044, z= 0.98,
Pr(,z) = 1.00); KCDC-IC =20.095, SE = 0.044, z=22.14,
Pr(,z) = 0.032. The reported p-values were adjusted for multiple
comparisons using the Bonferroni method).
The two experiments revealed a clearly distinct set of results:
The average response times in the acquisition compatible
subgroup of Experiment 3A (key-press only variation) did not
significantly differ from the acquisition incompatible subgroup. On
the other hand for key contact duration in Experiment 3B (key-
release only variation), there was a significant compatibility effect.
These results are in accordance with the prediction based on the
S-R model and are inconsistent with the predictions of the two-
step R-E model.
Conclusions
The incentive of the present study was to investigate ideomotor
action control, starting from a more elaborate than usual
conception of the action that participants perform in a reaction-
time task. Incorporating not only the (first) key-press response-
component but also the (second) key-release response-component
into the task analysis leads to the proposition of a twofold stimulus-
response model. This model was motivated by the results of
Experiment 1 and supported by those of Experiment 2A and 2B.
Finally, our S-R model was corroborated in a direct test against
the two-step R-E model in Experiment 3A and 3B, thereby
falsifying the latter model. More specifically: In Experiment 1 the
earlier findings of key-press response facilitation were replicated
and extended to the key-release movement. Contrary, each of the
action components loses the ability to be influenced by effect
priming when separated, as was done in Experiment 2A and 2B.
Moreover, as was demonstrated unambiguously in Experiment 3A
and 3B, using the most advanced and latest experimental setup in
this field, the effect did not influence the (preceding) key-press
movement but did influence the (succeeding) key-release move-
ment.
Together our results challenge the belief that the compatibility
effect found in movement selection within the effect priming
paradigm is caused by previously established couplings between
these movements and their subsequent effects, as has been
suggested by others (e.g. [20–24]). As a result, given that it is
unclear how to incorporate the present findings into the two-step
R-E model, it is difficult to maintain this model as a complete and
consistent description of the mechanisms underlying the ideomo-
tor principle. It is important to stress that this conclusion is
independent of whether the S-R based explanation presented here
as an alternative model might be proven incorrect by future
studies.
A possible objection to this study might be that the setup that
was chosen in the last two experiments, particularly the single-
movement actions, renders the two-step R-E model inapplicable.
First of all, as said before, there is nothing in the two-step R-E
model that suggests that single-movement actions cannot be
coupled to effects. This would in fact imply the nonexistence of
an associative mechanism for this type of actions, and, in that
case, the common-coding framework would face a serious
generalization problem. Besides, an alleged inappropriateness of
single-movement actions for associations can only explain the
null-results of Experiment 2. Since the acquisition phase of
Experiment 3 involved the canonical (i.e. two-movement) actions,
no obstacle for forming associations was presented there. And
clearly associations were formed in this experiment, but the
outcome was exactly as predicted by the alternative S-R model.
So irrespective of whether responses (being of the single- or
double-movement type) and effects can actually be coupled –and
there is nothing that suggests they cannot–, we can be certain that
only the S-R couplings played a role in the service of response
selection. This conclusion is supported by the present results,
particularly those of Experiment 3, providing evidence that
response-effect associations are not straightforwardly functional in
anticipatory action control.
It might still be objected that the single-movement actions used
in Experiment 2 and in the test phase of Experiment 3 are rather
atypical, and therefore perhaps impractical or difficult to perform
for participants. Because of this, it might be argued that action
control places relatively large demands on cognitive and atten-
tional resources, which leads to a reduced role of action-effect
associations. However, both types of single-movement responses
are part of the standard action repertoire that most modern
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individuals use on a daily basis. For instance, human-computer
interactions, such as scrolling texts in electronic documents or
websites using touch-pad, mouse or keyboard, require multiple
variations of extended/continued pressing movements or releasing
movements of the fingers. It was the case that experiment 3 elicited
more error responses than experiments 1 and 2. This was likely
due to the ‘sudden’ change in response action instruction after the
regular response action during the acquisition phase. The error
responses did not confound our results however, as they did not
vary systematically with trial compatibility. There is thus no reason
to expect that these particular actions would pose any additional
control constraints, compared to the two-movement actions of
Experiment 1 and the acquisition phase of Experiment 3. This
conclusion is supported by the observation that the response times
of the two-movement and one-movement response actions in
experiment 1 and 2 respectively are comparable after the one-
movement actions have been sufficiently practiced in the
acquisition phase (see Figure 2 and 3). There was no practice
opportunity in experiment 3, explaining the overall higher
response latencies (see Figure 5).
On a more general note, the present study clearly
emphasizes the limited and well-defined status that simple
contiguity associations have in the context of human action
control. Their existence and function seems to be restricted to
the realm of reactive and reflexive control of behavior. On the
other hand, mechanisms of a more complex organization are
likelier to be involved in the pro-active, prospective and
voluntary part of our behavior (see also [36]). In conclusion,
we propose that a better understanding of how the action
system becomes future oriented and goal directed will have to
come from a more complete definition and measurement of
action, as suggested here, focusing on how smaller movement
units are part of the larger context of the action. This notion is
at least partly recognized within the common-coding frame-
work and the theory of event coding, when referring to the
complexity of action control in real life versus that in a
laboratory experiment: ‘‘And yet, most models of action
control seem to take this highly artificial stimulus-response
situation so serious that they use it as a template for voluntary
action in general.’’ [37] Curiously, this insight does not lead to
any significant changes in the way the theory of event coding
investigates and accounts for action control.
Importantly, the alternative S-R model we presented in no
way disproves or challenges the truth status of the ideomotor
principle [1]. The model merely demonstrates that effect-
primed choice reaction tasks are not about ideomotor theory,
and vice versa, that the ideomotor principle is not about effect
priming.
Finally, the results presented here might have serious
implications for priming studies in other fields of psychology
as well (see [38]). Perhaps the rationale and working model
(based on S-R associations) could play a fruitful role in devising
novel experimental procedures and designs to test the nature of
priming effects more generally. We recommend critical
evaluation of the viability of the ontology assumed for the
Figure 5. Results of the test phase of Experiments 3A and Experiment 3B in one graph. The observed means (with 95% CI) for the two
types of response latency measured in Experiments 3A and 3B as a function of S-R Compatibility of the trials. The values of the means, confidence
intervals and size of the Compatibility Effect (CE) are reported in Table S1. Experiment 3A was the key-press only version (RT) and Experiment 3B the
key-release only (KCD) version. In these experiments, S-R Compatibility was measured between subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054094.g005
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associations between prime and primed response by a detailed
task analysis.
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